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Models for Concurrency Ubiquitous Computing: my perspective 





Semantic TheoriesUbiquitous Computing: my perspective 







(1) What “barbs” i.e. observations are 
required to give rise to an observation theory 
corresponding to the contexts as labels ?
(2) How to generate transition systems out of 
from SOS specification systems in the case of 
stochastic transition systems?Ubiquitous Computing: my perspective 





Spatial LogicsUbiquitous Computing: my perspective 





Programming LanguagesUbiquitous Computing: my perspective 




Resource Control Resource ControlUbiquitous Computing: my perspective 




Resource Control Resource ControlFeatures of Ubiquitous Computing like scalability, 
mobility, and incomplete information deeply affect 
security requirements.
One of the proposed approaches is to use a notion of 
computational trust, resembling the concept of trust 
among human beings.
Trust in UbiComApproaches to Trust
Credential-based Models
Predictive Models (“observe & learn”)
Overarching notion: Trust Policy express complex conditions based 
on elementary trust values.
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trust predicated on possession of predeﬁned credential
eg, password, RSA key, certiﬁcate, role, history, provenance, ...
a probabilistic model assigns a degree of conﬁdence to a 
principal’s ability to predict another principal’s behaviour.
eg, the behaviour of a principal A may be deﬁned as the 
probability that interaction with A yields a certain outcome.Data Provenance
➔ (Meta)data is almost entirely neglected in the process calculi
➔ Track data provenance both for its important applications and as an 
challenging exercise in modelling (meta)data.  
Aim at simplicity:
‣ data annotations representing provenance
‣ structure, interpretation and management of provenance information
‣ provenance tracking
➔ Provenance-based security (trust + data conﬁdentiality)
‣ Example: conference submission
➔ The overall ambition is to underpin and develop practical stuff, like 













Actual data Meta information 
describing the origin 
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Provenance model
Structure and interpretation of provenance€ 
v :ε ;a!κ1 ;b?κ2 ;b!(ε;c!κ3,b?κ4) ;...
It was sent by a 
on a channel 
with 
provenanceД1
Was then received by b on a 
channel with provenanceД2 
And then sent by b on a 
channel that b received 
from c…
Џ (empty provenance) 
denotes value v originated 
here
Provenance model
Structure and interpretation of provenanceConfidentiality in provenance 
systems
‣ Data may be public, yet its provenance conﬁdential, or vice 
versa
‣ Principals who may access data are not necessarily the 
same as those who may access its provenance
‣ Fine grained access control over provenance “histories” is 
needed as different parts of it have different sensitivity
Security requirements of 
data
Security requirements of 
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Examples of applications in trust & security
Estimate trust in an individual or set of individuals
Estimate input distribution of a noisy channel to compute the 
Bayes risk
Apply the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing 
(anonymity, information ﬂow)
...The outcome of an interaction between a principal a and a 
partner b is either successful or unsuccessful:
 
   
The probability that a partner b interacts successfully with 
a is governed by the parameter θ where:
Goal: infer (an approximation of) the probability of success 
Means:  Observe sequence of trials (observations)
Beta Trust Model
o ∈ {Succ, Fail}
θ = Pr(o = Succ)Beta Trust Model
Note that: the behaviour of the partner b represented by θ 
is assumed to be ﬁxed over time.
The estimated probability of success, B(Succ |o), at time t is 
the expected value of θ given the sequence of outcomes
o = {o0,o 1,...,o t}
B(Succ | o)=E[θ | o]The “Frequentist” method: 
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Assume an a priori probability distribution for θ (representing 
your partial knowledge about θ, whatever the source may be) 
and combine it with the evidence, using Bayes’ theorem, to 




Using evidence to infer θ
The “Bayesian” method:A Bayesian approach
Assumption:  θ is the generic value of a continuous random variable ƨ 
whose probability density is a Beta distribution with (unknown) 
parameters Ǌ, Ǎ
The uniform distribution is a particular case of Beta, forǊ	 , Ǎ	 
B	Ǌ, Ǎ
	 can be seen as the a posteriori probability density of ƨ	 given 
by a uniform a priori (principle of maximum entropy) and a trial 




Γ(σ)Γ(ϕ) θσ−1(1 − θ)ϕ−1
where Γ is the extension of the factorial function
i.e. Γ(n)=( n − 1)! for n natural numberThe Bayesian Approach
Following the approach, we have three probability density 
functions for ƨ:
B(Ǌ,Ǎ)            :  the “real” distribution of ƨ
B(ƹ,ƺ)            :  the a priori 
                           (our estimate of the distribution of ƨ)
B(s +ƹ, f +ƺ)   :  the a posteriori 
                           (the distribution of ƨ	 after the trials)




s + f + α + β
=
s + α
n + α + βTrust Inference Process
O1= S
O2= S O3= F
O4= F O5= STrust Inference Process
The distribution of θ after 40 interactions 
25 Successful and 15 FailedThe Frequentist approach can be worse than the Bayesian approach even when 
the trials give a “good” result, or when we consider the average difference 
(from the “true” θ) wrt all possible results
30
































A better function would be












The Frequentist approach can be worse than the Bayesian approach even when 
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The Frequentist approach can be worse than the Bayesian approach even when 
the trials give a “good” result, or when we consider the average difference 
(from the “true” θ) wrt all possible results
Bayesian vs Frequentist Deﬁne a “difference’’ D(A(n,s),ǀ) (not necessarily a distance)
 non-negative
 zero iff  A(n,s) =ǀ
 Consider the expected value DE(A,n,ǀ) of D(A(n,s),ǀ) with 
respect to the likelihood (the conditional probability of s |ǀ)
 Risk of A : the expected value R(A,n) of DE(A,n,ǀ) with respect 










Measuring the precision of 
Bayesian algorithmsWe have considered the following candidates for D(x,y) 
(all of which can be extended to the n-ary case): 
 The norms:  
 |x - y|
 |x - y|2
 ...
 |x - y|k
 ...
 The Kullback-Leibler divergence
35
DKL((y,1 − y) ￿ (x,1 − x)) = y log2
y
x
+ (1 − y)log2
1 − y
1 − x
Measuring the precision of 
Bayesian algorithms Theorem. For the mean-based Bayesian algorithms, with a priori B
(ƹƺ), we have that the condition is satisﬁed (i.e. the Risk is 
minimum when ƹƺ coincide with the parameters Ǌ, Ǎ	 of the 
“true” distribution), by the following functions: 
 The 2nd norm (x - y)2  
 The Kullback-Leibler divergence 
 Surprising that the condition is satisﬁed by these two very different 
functions, and not by any of the other norms  |x - y|k  for kÛ2. 
 It leaves the search open for a measure for assessment and 
comparison of trust algorithm.
36
Measuring the precision of 
Bayesian algorithmsPotential applications
 We can use DE to compare two different estimation algorithms; 
develop a measure of quality for “decision-making” algorithms
 Mean-based vs other ways of selecting a ǀ
 Bayesian vs non-Bayesian
 In more complicated scenarios there may be different Bayesian 
mean-based algorithms; eg.:  noisy channels.
37Potential applications (ctd)
 DE induces a metric on distributions.  Bayes’ equations deﬁne 
transformations on this metric space from the a priori to the a 
posteriori. 
 Study the properties of such transformations to reveal interesting 
properties of the corresponding Bayesian methods,  independent of 
the a priori. 
 Hypothesis testing (privacy,  anonymity, conﬁdentiality, information ﬂow 
analysis, input distribution analysis, ...) : 
 determine (probabilistic) bounds as to what probability-distribution 
inference algorithm may determine about you, your online activity, 
your software
38Limitation of the Beta model
The assumption that a principal behaviour is ﬁxed is not always 
realistic:
The behaviour of a principal may depend on its internal state 
which may change over time.Modelling Dynamic Behaviour
Modelling static behaviour as a probability distribution over 
outcomes leads to modelling the dynamic behaviour by a 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM).
A single state in an HMM models the system behaviour at a 
particular time.Hidden Markov Model:A simpler model: Beta with Decay
The probability distribution over outcomes changes over time.
 
Old observations are given less weight (decayed) than more 
recent observations.
Weights of observations are controlled by the decay factor r. Beta Trust Model with Decay



















1 if x = o
0 otherwiseHow good is the model ?
Given a dynamic system modelled by an HMM λ we deﬁne 
Beta estimation error as follows
where r is the decay factor, and α is the real probability 
that next outcome is Success
Error(λ,r)=E
￿
(B(Succ | o) − α)2 ￿System stability
System stability is the expected probability of the HMM 
remaining in the same state.
Consider the system modelled by HMM: Unstable system Stable system Very stable system Conclusion (in general)
49
A whole wholly-different conception of computing to 
be developed: hard to talk of “further” work in general
Chieﬂy, nowhere like here apps w/out sound models 
are dangerous, and theory without practice is pointless Conclusion (in general)
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A whole wholly-different conception of computing to 
be developed: hard to talk of “further” work in general
Chieﬂy, nowhere like here apps w/out sound models 
are dangerous, and theory without practice is pointless 
The gap between Theory and Practice matters in practice
(although it may not matter in theory)
One thing I know: as one cannot “model-check” UbiNet, 
security & privacy in UbiCom must be coupled with trust Conclusion (personal take)
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in the short term:
‣ hiding and multiview in provenance trees 
‣ measures suitable to compare trust-algorithms
‣ reputation in HMMs
‣ integration of anonymity protocols and trust
in the longer term:
‣ programming language bindings
‣ data conﬁdentiality and then privacy
‣ ...
‣ ...